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395 
Classification Standards for Health 





Secondary health information research requires vast 
quantities of data in order to make clinical and health delivery 
breakthroughs. Restrictive policies that limit the use of such 
information threaten to stymie this research. While the Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the new Common Rule permits 
patients to provide broad consent for the use of their information 
for research, that policy offers insufficient flexibility. This Article 
suggests a flexible consenting system that allows patients to 
consent to a range of privacy risks. The details of the system will 
be fleshed out in future work.    
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I. Introduction 
Secondary research using health information is on the rise. 
Not all informational research presents equal burdens. Yet, there 
has been little commentary on the distinction between different 
kinds of informational research. This Article helps remedy this 
problem. In so doing, it sets out the first step towards a blueprint 
for Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) and other actors who must 
decide what kinds of constraints to apply to different kinds of 
information.  
The Article first briefly explains what constitutes secondary 
research of health information and outlines the problem. Second, 
it points to analogous contexts in which health information is 
categorized. Third, relying on Helen Nissenbaum’s approach to 
privacy as contextual integrity, it argues for a “scoring” 
methodology that IRBs should use in determining information 
sensitivity.    
II. Secondary Research of Health Information  
Today, medical breakthroughs are increasingly coming from 
“informational” or “secondary” research, that is, research that 
aggregates information about patients, including physical 
conditions, genetic information, treatments, responses, and 
outcomes. This research gives researchers a real-world snapshot 
at a population-wide level in a way that is not possible with 
traditional clinical trials. Data from clinical contexts are fed back 
into databases in a “continuous feedback loop” that iteratively 
helps improve clinical and health-delivery outcomes.1 The new 
form of research is prominently foregrounded in new policy 
initiatives. The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) Comparative 
Effective Research (CER), the Food and Drug Administration’s 
(FDA) Sentinel post-market drug surveillance programs, and the 
receipt proposed changes to the Common Rule that apply to all 
                                                                                                     
 1.  See INSTITUTES OF MEDICINE, INTEGRATING RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 13 
(2014) [hereinafter INTEGRATING].  
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federally funded research consciously highlight secondary 
research approaches.2   
This new research is important and widespread but requires 
vast quantities of information. Numerous private payers, major 
health systems, data intermediaries, and government entities 
aggregate vast quantities of data that they use and sell to others 
to, among other purposes, determine health outcomes, marketing 
practices, health delivery procedures, and the like.3 For example, 
agglomerating data has allowed researchers to identify genetic 
mutations that presage high risks of breast cancer or 
Alzheimer’s.4 Drug administration in general may change. Drug 
absorption, drug distribution, drug metabolism and elimination, 
drug concentration at the target site, and the receptivity of the 
target receptors may vary from individual to individual based on 
various factors that secondary research may well discover.5    
The research also has non-clinical uses. It helps develop 
necessary health quality measures and helps identify areas to 
target for cost reduction. Hospital readmission rates, for example, 
were found to be correlated with mental depression in 
Washington, D.C. hospitals.6 This research also supports older 
mechanisms, such as clinical trials, by helping identify potential 
subjects that can be targeted for recruitment.7 And it renders 
                                                                                                     
 2.  See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 
53,933, 53,938 (Sept. 8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46) [hereinafter 
NPRM]; Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes 
Through Personal Comparison of Treatment Effectiveness Based on Electronic 
Health Records, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 425 (2011) (noting that CER 
represents a major public health enterprise, for which Congress has allocated 
billions of dollars since 2009). 
 3.  See Nicholas Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy 
Exceptionalism, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 66 (2014) (noting that big data facilitates 
the creation of health data proxies).  
 4.  For a longer list that is screenable through, for example, PGD, see 
What We Test For, GENESIS GENETICS, http://genesisgenetics.org/pgd/what-we-
test-for/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 5.  See, e.g., Allen D. Roses, Pharmacogenetics and Future Drug 
Development and Delivery, 355 LANCET 1358 (2000).  
 6.  ALEX PENTLAND ET AL., BIG DATA AND HEALTH 31 (2013).  
 7.  See Tracy Stuardi et al., Database Recruitment: A Solution to Poor 
Recruitment in Randomized Trials?, 28 FAM. PRAC. 329, 329 (2011) (discussing 
database recruitment); Walter F. Stewart et al., Bridging the Inferential Gap: 
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possible investigations of situations where it would be impossible 
or unethical to carry out clinical trials, including where doctors 
suspect a drug has dangerous side effects, or investigating off-
label uses. These benefits are just the tip of the iceberg. 
The ultimate goal is to create what policymakers call a 
learning health system.8 Each clinical intervention will feed back 
into centrally accessible databases. Analytics from these 
databases will set standards for treating patients. These 
standards will optimize treatment protocols after taking into 
account numerous factors, including the individual genetic and 
behavioral profile of the patient, and structural considerations, 
such as cost, limits to medical infrastructure in a particular 
geographical area, and staffing needs, among other variables. 
Providers will treat patients depending on their profile using 
these insights. The outcome from those treatments will be fed 
back into the database, producing even more refined insights. 
And of course, data will be used to craft policy decisions and 
initiatives in areas ranging from drug approval to 
reimbursement, medical curricular reform, and health 
discrimination policy.9   
III. The Problem  
Although the fruits of collection are plentiful, information 
collection imposes burdens on individuals.10 The inadvertent 
release of health information can impose objective harms on 
individuals if it is used inappropriately, ranging from 
discrimination in employment and insurance, to reputational 
                                                                                                     
The Electronic Health Record and Clinical Evidence, 26 HEALTH AFF. 181,  
182–83 (2007) (noting the shortcomings of RCTs—that they are too selective and 
ignore comorbidities—and that secondary research helps bridge the gap).  
 8.  See INSTITUTES OF MEDICINE, BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO 
CONTINUOUSLY LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 3 (2012) (noting that health 
care policy improvement requires that payments for services should reward 
desired care outcomes and movement toward providing the best care at a lower 
cost).  
 9.  See generally id. (explaining how health system analytics can improve 
the quality of healthcare services). 
 10.  See generally sources cited infra notes 11–12 (setting forth examples of 
such burdens).   
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loss. Even if these harms do not eventually occur, the 
psychological discomfort that comes from the fear of 
inappropriate use, whether or not it accurately estimates the risk 
of these other harms, is itself a separate harm.11 Finally, even if 
there is no actual information misuse, or fear of misuse, 
individuals also consider privacy intrusions as disrespectful and 
harmful to their autonomy.12    
Nonetheless, the privacy risks from different kinds of data 
are different. Existing and proposed research rules seek to take 
this into account. For example, under the existing Common Rule 
and under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA), research with sufficiently deidentified information 
can proceed unhindered. Unless the IRB grants a waiver, 
researchers need to obtain specific and informed consent before 
accessing information for secondary research.13 
The proposed version of the Common Rule does not maintain 
as strict a division between identified and deidentified data—
although HIPAA restrictions would still apply to most secondary 
data. But it proposes other distinctions. For example, it 
distinguishes between data collected for research and non-
research purposes.14  
                                                                                                     
 11.  See, e.g., Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 
1131, 1138–39 (2010) (noting the potential harms arising from collection of 
individuals’ health information disclosures).  
 12.  See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and 
Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 1008 (1989) (noting that the 
right to control disclosure of intimate information is constitutive of the norms of 
privacy and human autonomy). These concepts are expanded upon in Craig 
Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions passim (Feb. 10, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 13.  See generally 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2006); SECRETARY’S ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS (SACHRP), FAQS, TERMS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON INFORMED CONSENT AND RESEARCH USE OF BIOSPECIMENS 
(July 20, 2011), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp/commsec/attachmentdfaq'stermsandrecommend
ations.pdf.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2016) (answering frequently asked questions 
related to relating to informed consent and research use of biospecimens) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 14.  See NPRM, supra note 2, at 53,933, 53,973 (noting the NPRM’s 
proposal to distinguish between the consent required for data collected for 
research and non-research purposes).  
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Yet these distinctions seem to have been picked somewhat 
arbitrarily. To be sure, it makes a difference whether the 
information is identifiable and the purposes for which it was 
collected. But these are only two criteria among a multitude of 
other criteria that could be utilized. A more systematic method 
for defining data sensitivity is necessary. 
Looking to other arenas provides some assistance. For 
example, organizations, including the federal government, 
frequently adopt data classification standards that determine, for 
example, whether and what data is highly classified or 
confidential, internally circulable, or publicly available.15 Yet, 
these standards gauge the sensitivity of information by the extent 
to which agency functioning would be impaired if, inter alia, 
privacy were breached. Because the standards rarely discuss the 
principles behind the methodology they adopt in ways that can 
apply to other contexts, they are not of much assistance.    
IV. Contextual Integrity and Privacy 
In order to develop this account, this Part turns to Helen 
Nissenbaum’s influential explanation of contextual integrity. 
Privacy involves control over the flow of information. The rules of 
access and use that ultimately determine flow are determined by 
context. Nissenbam argues that our lives can generally be divided 
into multiple contexts, spheres, or fields.16 Social norms 
recognized by most members of society as controlling dictate 
appropriate behavior in those contexts. Communities are defined 
by these shared norms, “common understandings and shared 
interests, which . . . facilitate . . . mutual interaction” among their 
members.17 The norms of the context may prescribe greater or 
less access to the information depending on the context. As long 
as these norms are complied with, there are no privacy intrusions 
simply because information has been accessed.   
                                                                                                     
 15.  The most important of these is the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and 
Information Systems, 199 FIPS (2004).   
 16.  See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 132 (2010) (setting forth 
this argument).  
 17.  Post, supra note 12, at 991.  
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Thus, for example, I may provide a doctor with certain 
information that I would never give friends and vice versa. The 
rules of each context are shaped by numerous forces. In some 
“highly ritualized” contexts, roles and actions are guided by a 
detailed set of norms; in other contexts, the norms are less well-
defined.18 There may be variation in the way different individuals 
or groups treat information if the norms are open-ended or if 
there is disagreement. Finally, privacy norms are malleable. One 
can shift norms such that information regarding a particular 
issue is no longer private in a given context, and public discussion 
becomes normalized.19 
To determine whether privacy has been respected, 
Nissenbaum considers three main, but non-exhaustive, 
contextual elements:20 (1) The context, or backdrop, where the 
disclosure takes place. Contexts are characterized by different 
kinds of activities and values—such as medical, intimate, 
educational, and other contexts. The amount and kind of 
information we circulate will depend on the context. (2) The 
actors involved, which include the discloser, the disclosee, and the 
subject of the information. The same context may have different 
actors with different roles—thus, we may release different kinds 
and amounts of information to nurses, orderlies, or doctors, all in 
the medical setting. (3) Transmission principles, which define the 
kinds of information flow. The release may be forced, voluntary, 
mutual, unidirectional, etc.21 To Nissenbaum’s account, this 
Article will add one additional consideration: (4) The purpose of 
the collection. A doctor reading a patient’s chart in a medical 
setting would only satisfy privacy norms if the purpose of her 
reading the chart was to treat the patient.   
                                                                                                     
 18.  NISSENBAUM, supra note 16, at 129. 
 19.  See, e.g., Matt Ferner, These Photos of Legal Recreational Marijuana 
Users Shatter Stereotypes, HUFF. POST (Mar. 16, 2015, 12:32 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/16/photos-recreational-
marijuana_n_7075710.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (“Marijuana is being 
covered by the media in an increasingly sophisticated and nuanced way now 
that the laws are changing and more people are ‘out’ as marijuana users . . . .”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 20.  NISSENBAUM, supra note 16, at 143. 
 21.  Id. at 145.  
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In the case of breach that results in a privacy intrusion, or 
surveillance, there is a mismatch between the information type 
and one or more of the remaining contextual elements. In the 
interests of clarity, this Article shall refer to any element that 
does not match with the kind of information involved as the 
mismatched or intruding element. These are the elements that 
take the place usually occupied by the appropriate element in the 
particular interaction.   
Consider the case of private medical information. If your 
colleagues seek such information, there will be a mismatch of 
both context and actors: Medical information generally is not 
accessed in employment contexts by one’s colleagues. Similarly, 
even in a medical context, the wrong kind of actor—say an 
orderly—may invade your privacy by reading your medical chart. 
Next, there could be a mismatch of transmission principles. A 
doctor can invade your privacy by obtaining your information 
using the wrong transmission principle—for example, by 
threatening to withhold treatment unless you volunteer 
information you otherwise do not wish to. Finally, a mismatch of 
purpose can result in an intrusion, for example, where a doctor 
collected medical information in a medical context but for 
purposes other than treatment—say, to write a research paper 
without obtaining consent. 
Finally, certain circumstances can lessen or increase the risk 
of a contextual violation. The key consideration is whether the 
information can be traced back to the individual who provided it. 
If the information can be traced back, then it becomes that much 
easier to apply the information to other contexts of the 
individual’s life.    
V. Scoring Intrusions 
This Article offers Nissenbaum’s account as a basis for a 
scoring system that IRBs should use when determining the type 
of risk a certain kind of research project presents. The scoring 
system could consist of various attributes—five of which are 
listed above. The IRB would score, not contextual variables 
themselves, but rather, how much the contextual variables of the 
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proposed research differ from those of the original research—
what this Article shall call the differential score.  
Thus, if all or some of the original research team are involved 
in the new research, or if the purpose of the new research does 
not deviate sharply from the purpose of the old research—for 
example, because it is examining the same disease—then the 
differential score would be low. But even if the actors and the 
purpose are similar, the context may change. The same 
researchers may have departed from a university and may now 
be working on the same disease for a commercial institution. This 
change of context will increase the differential score.   
But the IRB must also consider the risk that the information, 
once conveyed to the new research project, may leak to other 
contexts. The risk of leakage leading to violations big and small 
increase dramatically to the degree the data is identified or 
identifiable. Without identifiable information, it would be that 
much harder to carry out even more grievous invasions, for 
example, by transferring information regarding a disease to the 
employment context. Because the harm that leakage may cause is 
somewhat incalculable, an IRB may choose not to quantify all of 
the secondary, or rather, tertiary, harms that could come from 
leakage of information to yet another context. Rather, they 
should assess the risk that the information may be re-identified. 
In so doing, IRBs can draw from existing methodologies used in 
privacy impact assessments—which themselves have drawn 
limited academic attention.22 Using the scoring mechanism, the 
IRB could come up with a “total score” that would determine 
what procedures would need to be in place to ensure that the data 
subjects are projected.  
VI. Remedy 
With this kind of nuanced scoring system, data subjects 
should not be protected using an all-or-nothing approach. Under 
                                                                                                     
 22.  See Roger Clarke, Privacy Impact Assessment: Its Origins and 
Development, 25 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 123, 123 (2009) (“Privacy impact 
assessment (PIA) is a systematic process for evaluating the potential effects on 
privacy of a project, initiative or proposed system or scheme.”).  
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the current system, unless an individual consents, or a waiver is 
granted, identifiable data is out. Under the Common Rule moving 
forward, if data is not covered by HIPAA rules, there are 
distinctions between whether the data was collected for research 
versus non-research purposes, which tracks my suggestion that 
the purpose of the original context and the new context be 
compared. But overall, identifiable data could be used in certain 
circumstances if the individual, when the information was 
collected, offered broad consent for the information to be used for 
all further research.   
Under the new approach, however, individuals can offer a 
more calibrated breadth of consent. Rather than being offered an 
all-or-nothing approach—provide broad consent for all future 
research or only limited consent for this project—they may allow 
only for research that departs from the original context of 
collection by a certain amount. The breadth of consent score can 
be “tagged” to the information.23 Once an IRB’s scoring of a new 
research project is established, only those records at or above the 
IRB’s score can be (automatically) included in the research.   
Problems will remain with research biases. Today, we know 
that some groups of individuals are categorically less likely to 
participate in research.24 Those individuals may also, under the 
proposed regime, offer narrower consent systematically.  
Potentially, such biases in studies can be remedied in the 
following manner. IRBs can, in the right circumstances, apply to 
Office for Human Research Protections or the relevant federal 
agency for some sort of minority waiver, under which those 
individuals in underrepresented groups who offer the broadest 
consent will also be included in the study in sufficient numbers 
such that the underrepresentation does not reach a certain 
threshold. To be sure, that means that some individuals’ 
information will be included in projects to which they would not 
have consented. But the approach offered by this Article is the 
                                                                                                     
 23.  Cf. NPRM supra note 2, at 53,973 (suggesting that the information be 
tagged in various ways to indicated breadth of consent).  
 24.  See INSTITUTES OF MEDICINE, CLINICAL DATA AS THE BASIC STAPLE FOR A 
LEARNING HEALTH SYSTEM 96 (2010) (indicating that people with potentially 
stigmatizing health conditions, such as those tied to mental health, genetics, or 
sexually transmitted diseases, are particularly concerned about professional 
health researchers seeing their medical records). 
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best approach for achieving the public interest, which sometimes 
requires overriding private preferences and respecting individual 
preferences, because those most averse to information collection 
will not have their data used.  
VII. Conclusion 
This Article has offered a very brief explanation of a way to 
reform the manner in which we assess data sensitivity and the 
way in which we implement protections based on the scoring 
system. More importantly, it has provided the ethical explanation 
that undergirds this analysis. The principles offered here can 
therefore be expanded upon to create an ethical but nuanced and 
automated system by which to carry out secondary health 
information research.   
 
 
